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OBC-LI-1772~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FAMILIARIZATION COURSE
(Project USEFUL #8)CURRENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF COORDINATION
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Presented by

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BACKGROUND

We entered World War II without a national mechanism to pull together the intelligence information available to the United States. During that war, intelligence required for the military conduct of the war by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was coordinated by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This committee included representatives, not only of the military services, but also the State Department, the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration. However, its function was solely to support JCS strategic planning, and its coordination was accomplished by committee vote supported by a full time staff detailed from the various agencies.

One of the early efforts to coordinate information for the President occurred in May 1940 when an office for emergency management was established at the national level. A few months later the forerunner of a centralized intelligence service was established under General W. J. Donovan as a Coordinator of information but he was not to interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the President's military and naval advisers. The need for tighter coordination was evident and in less than a year General Donovan's

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office was placed under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the duration of World War II. The function was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Therefore, during World War II, there was no individual or agency responsible at the top national level for coordinating intelligence for the President or the heads of the executive departments. Frequently intelligence sources vied for the ear of the President.

About one year before the end of the war, studies were undertaken within the OSS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the concept of a permanent, centralized, national intelligence service. The resulting views were presented to the President who by Executive Order, on 22 January 1946, formally authorized the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunners of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The directive from the President stated, "It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security."

The first official designation of a Director of Central Intelligence appeared in this directive, "A Central Intelligence Group, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence --

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shall be designated by me. He shall -- correlate and evaluate -- plan for coordination of the several intelligence agencies -- and perform for the benefit of said agencies services of common concern."

Thus, upon the initiative of the Executive Department, the United States for the first time in its history, launched a national intelligence organization. The first Director of Central Intelligence was Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, United States Navy Reserve.

Just as General Donovan and his Strategic Services (OSS) kept the pressure on the White House for a national intelligence authority responsible to the President, so did the Central Intelligence Group keep the pressure on to obtain enabling legislation for a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Additionally, it must be remembered that in 1947, Congress and the President's office were strongly influenced by the Pearl Harbor investigations which showed the need for an effective national intelligence system. This was stressed in House and Senate hearings on the National Security Act bill, and witness after witness testified as to the value of centralized intelligence.

The National Security Act of 1947

There followed very little opposition in Congress to the plan for a central intelligence service and on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act became the law of the land and the Central Intelligence Agency was born.

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The Agency was fourteen (14) years old in July. It is a teenager in the Government and is experiencing the usual frustration of becoming a man and overcoming the suspicions of its elders.

A review of the Congressional debates indicates that when CIA was first proposed, Congress was primarily interested in a mechanism for coordinating intelligence, apparently motivated by the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency, and authorized the President to appoint a Director of Central Intelligence, "who shall be the head thereof." This Act also placed the Agency under the orders of the National Security Council, and charged the Agency with the duty of making recommendations to the Council "for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security."

National Security Council Intelligence Directives

Appropriate recommendations having been made by the Director of Central Intelligence, the first order on the books from the Council (National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1) emphasized, as did Congress, the dominant importance of coordinating foreign intelligence activities of the United States. These directives are usually referred to as "non-skids."

Pointing at what I choose to call his number one "hat", this NSC Directive made the Director of Central Intelligence individually responsible for over-all coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

As the Director of Central Intelligence has national responsibilities for the coordination of foreign intelligence activities of other agencies of the Government, the National Security Council provided him with an important implement to pull together the intelligence community, which is now called the United States Intelligence Board.

This Board is an important forum for intelligence coordination. It has a total membership of ten, of which six represent the principal collectors and producers of intelligence; namely, the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, who also in his dual capacity represents the views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the National Security Agency. Two other agencies are not extensively engaged in foreign intelligence activities but sit on the USIB as occasional contributors -- the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Finally, there is a representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Functioning directly under, and in support of the USIB, are 21 committees. Some of these in turn have subcommittees or working groups through which they discharge part of their responsibilities. A number of these committees and their subordinate elements are concerned primarily with the production of finished intelligence; others deal with the coordination of guidance to collection and processing activities and with a variety of reference services and other support.

The manpower engaged primarily in the foreign intelligence effort totals [redacted] More [redacted] the intelligence personnel are related to Department of Defense activities. Extensive studies of the cost estimates for the entire foreign intelligence

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effort have been initiated. It now appears that this effort represents a substantial part of the Federal budget.

In addition to Intelligence Directive No. 1, which prescribes the basic duties and responsibilities of the Director in the field of coordination, there are seven other specific Directives covering subjects such as coordination of overt collection activities, intelligence production, [redacted] coordination of espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad, critical intelligence communications and the new National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

When the NSC Directives are received, the Director, with the advice and concurrence of the USIB, issues his own implementing documents. These are known as the Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Thirty-six of these Directives are in effect at this time.

The Director's Mechanism for Coordination

In addition to the USIB, the Director uses his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the three Deputy Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and other resources of the Agency to assist him in his role of Coordinator.

For approximately three years the Agency also had a fourth Deputy Director who was responsible for assisting the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating the intelligence activities of the Government. This position was abolished in April 1960. It was held by General Truscott, U. S. Army, until his retirement.

To maintain this coordinating function a new position has been established on the personal staff of the Director with title of

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Assistant for Coordination. This is a significant change as it removes the position from the Central Intelligence Agency proper and places it organizationally apart from any department or agency and with sole responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence: In other words, responsible to Mr. Dulles wearing his hat as national coordinator of intelligence.

The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, which I will discuss later, completed its report on 15 December 1960 included this statement in the body of the report:

"To provide for including full-time professionals in the field of coordination and minimizing the conflict of interest problem, we propose that the Director of Central Intelligence organize under his Assistant for Coordination and as part of his personal staff, a full-time group of intelligence professionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather than to any one member agency. Membership on the staff would be drawn from the foreign intelligence community-at-large."

The National Security Council indorsed and President Eisenhower approved the establishment of a coordination staff two days before he left office. The Staff currently consists of ten officers. The Assistant for Coordination and Deputy Assistant were appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, three members (one each from the DD/Plans, DD/Intelligence and DD/Support) are detailed from the Central Intelligence Agency, and one member each has been detailed from the

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Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and the National Security Agency. The grade structure is GS-15 or above, or Colonels or Navy Captains. The staff average is 16 years intelligence experience per member.

The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

A meeting on 6 May 1960 between the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities resulted in a decision to establish an ad hoc Joint Study Group to review specified aspects of the foreign intelligence effort of the United States Government.

The Group's terms of reference provided that the attention of the Study Group would be focused primarily on the organizational and management aspects of the foreign intelligence effort. More specifically, the Study Group was directed to examine requirements, which are the means by which intelligence producers or researchers request collection; the adaptation of collection assets to changing needs; the method by which the intelligence community periodically evaluates its efforts; the military intelligence coordinating machinery, particularly as related to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; the implementation of intelligence directives, particularly as related to providing intelligence support to field commanders; and the coordination of the research and development effort of the intelligence community.

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The Study Group met 90 times for periods ranging from two to nine hours each, and received briefings or presentations or engaged in discussions with 51 organizations. A total of 320 senior officials, at home and abroad, appeared before the Study Group.

While the majority of the meetings of the Study Group were held in Washington, the Study Group traveled to a number of intelligence installations within the United States and spent five weeks in Europe examining the intelligence activities of the Department of State, the three military services, the four U. S. cryptologic agencies, the major military commands, including the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Study Group presented its report to the principals on 15 December 1960. The report contains 43 recommendations of which 30 were subsequently concurred in without change by the National Security Council, 12 were concurred in with modification and one was deferred. The President approved the action of the National Security Council on 18 January 1961.

The approved recommendations directed action under nine principal objectives.

1. Reorganization. Five recommendations.

The establishment of the Department of Defense Intelligence Agency on 1 August 1961 is a major and far reaching step toward the accomplishment of this objective. The action is responsive to several of the Joint Study Group recommendations.

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2. Management. Six recommendations.

The Director's Coordination Staff recently provided the United States Intelligence Board with an analysis of future intelligence plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1963 of each member of the intelligence community as a management tool.

3. Coordination. Three recommendations.

The establishment of the DCI's Coordination Staff is an example of action under this objective.

4. Personnel. Five recommendations.

The Department of Defense has initiated action which could provide the benefits of a career intelligence service to qualified military and civilian officers, through improvements in their selection, training, rank and personnel management.

5. Clandestine Collection. Five recommendations.

As an example, the military services are encouraged to step up the development of and maintain a capability for clandestine intelligence collection, especially for wartime purposes, under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence.

6. Security. Five recommendations.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board is exploring one facet of this problem, i.e., to promote uniformity in overseas security programs and a fuller exchange and use of counterintelligence information by security officers responsible for the programs.

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7. Research and Development. Three recommendations.

Representatives of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency together with a representative of the Director's Coordination Staff have agreed upon and recommended to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence better coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes, as an initial step in this important and expensive field. Research and development represents the most promising avenue by which we can overcome the security barriers raised by the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

8. Requirements. Six recommendations.

One example in this category is the recommendation that all military requirements at the Washington level be coordinated by Defense so as to prevent duplication or concentration on low priority targets.

9. Miscellaneous. Four recommendations.

Among these is the provision for the Central Intelligence Agency to increase intelligence support to unified and component commanders by direct dissemination of all information reports from pertinent field stations. The criterion is that if a CIA field information report is given local dissemination at the station, it should also be sent to the unified and component commanders.

The report of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government is receiving increasing attention throughout the intelligence community as more of the responsible

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officials are made aware of its content and authority. They recognize that the scope and magnitude of the Group's investigation cover many common areas of intelligence interest which have long needed an impartial look by a dedicated group of senior officers, constituted by executive authority and representing the interests of the intelligence community as a whole.

The Department of Defense is responsible for the implementation of 13 of the recommendations. The intelligence community represented by the United States Intelligence Board has 12. The Director of Central Intelligence as the Coordinator has four. The Central Intelligence Agency has four, and the Department of State has two. The remaining seven recommendations are joint responsibilities involving either State, Defense, CIA or the Director. Over-all responsibility for coordination of these Joint Study Group recommendations are the responsibility of Mr. Dulles as are all other foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council Directives.

The Director's Coordination Staff which I have described to you has the general mission of assisting the Director with all of his coordinating responsibilities pertaining to intelligence activities of the Government.

In developing their recommendations, the Joint Study Group noted that if the United States is to be prepared in this missile age it must be assured of the best possible flow of information about enemy strength.

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dispositions, combat readiness, science and technology, and probable intention in sufficient quantity and detail to support the commanders' mission.

It cannot be said with any assurance, short of the actual event, that this flow of information is now sufficient to provide the desirable warning and security of command, or assuming that it is now sufficient, that it will not suddenly dry up sometime in the future. Consequently, only the best coordinated overt and clandestine efforts will suffice. Since the military services will need to mount clandestine operations in time of war, the time to develop and exercise the capability is now. Consequently, it is especially important that the military services raise the professionalism of their intelligence personnel, not only to increase over-all responsiveness to the imperatives of command and early warning, but to facilitate coordination within the total U. S. effort and to prevent compromise and loss of valuable assets.

In attempting to visualize the future role of military intelligence, the Study Group noted that increasingly powerful, sophisticated and costly weapons systems of mass destruction are becoming available to both the United States and the USSR. In such a confrontation, foreign intelligence regarding a technological breakthrough has great significance. The Study Group stressed, however, that intelligence must avoid concentrating so exclusively on military aspects of the power balance that it overlooks economic and political aspects of that balance and of the free world, generally.

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To insure that intelligence will be equal to the great demands placed upon it, it must be viewed as an integrated program demanding an intense effort, closely coordinated planning, and the allocation of resources in money and human skills comparable to weapons systems of the highest priority and on an equal footing with them. In view of the importance of intelligence, it was recommended that the chiefs of the military intelligence services, as well as those in commands and joint staffs, should have equal position and rank to their operational counterparts.

As to the requirement for better intelligence training, it was noted that if a need for better trained military intelligence officers is essential to more effective attache systems, it is even more imperative in the field of clandestine operations. Many CIA operatives have now accumulated years of agent-handling experience and, in doing so, have acquired a substantial degree of professional competence. The military services must strive for a similar degree of competence. This cannot be accomplished, except in individual cases, under the existing personnel rotation system. In the absence of increased operational skill, not only will intelligence results suffer, but also interagency friction based on lack of professional confidence will continue. It is questionable that the military services will or can achieve the needed level of intelligence operational competence without instituting something resembling a career intelligence service.

The CIA has developed a good training system, and the Study Group felt that its facilities should be made available to all agencies

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running clandestine operations. There should be a mutual sharing of the skills, experiences and operational knowledge by all concerned. Their Recommendation No. 13 states, Quote, "The Central Intelligence Agency should open its clandestine training facilities to other agencies as a service of common concern." Plans for implementing this recommendation are being developed within CIA and Defense, in the latter case by specific directive of the Secretary of Defense at the time he established the new Department of Defense Intelligence Agency.

Requirements

One of the most involved and perplexing problems considered by the Study Group is that of intelligence requirements and evaluation. The Group was concerned with the inadequacy of current mechanisms within the intelligence community for the guidance of the collection efforts by selective levying of requirements, and subsequent evaluation of the intelligence generated by these requests for information. They noted within the Washington community that no single general requirements system existed, and that no single place existed where an analyst or agency could determine if needed information had already been collected and how it could be located for exploitation, or if a requirement for the same information is outstanding on the part of an analyst from a second agency, although some approximation exists in the CIA's Office of Central Reference. The same lack of coordination facilities exist in the field.

Until the Defense Intelligence Agency was created, there was no place within the Department of Defense for centralized reviewing and screening, or for the coordination of all military requirements.

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The same situation exists within the Central Intelligence Agency where each major component maintains its own requirements office as well as requirements personnel at division and branch level. This problem is being reviewed.

Requirements for the National Security Agency (NSA) and the services cryptologic agencies are controlled by the United States Intelligence Board through its committee structure.

Requirements for the Department of State are reviewed on a geographic basis by intelligence officers and the various policy desk officers through whom flow all requirements to respective embassies and consulates.

The Study Group found numerous problems in the requirements field. Most are predicated on the lack of central coordination of requirements.

Requirements in general are not sufficiently tailored to collection assets or resources. Too often requirements for collection are duplicative, incomplete relative to community needs, scattered out to collectors in excessive numbers, and too often without indication of priority in relation to other outstanding requirements of the same general urgency.

Field collectors are anxious to have less requirements, clearer indication of priority and more precise requirements.

The Study Group made five recommendation pertaining to the requirements problem. They can be generally summarized as proposing the establishment of a central requirements facility to coordinate all

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types of intelligence requirements, and using the facilities of the Office of Central Reference, CIA; the integration of requirements manuals into one common community-wide series; and the strengthening of coordination procedures at overseas posts.

The requirements problems over the years have tended to become more and more complex, and the specific steps to implement the Joint Study Group recommendations on this subject must take into account existing agency administrative and command procedures.

The increasing volume and complexity of data flowing into the community has become unmanageable and we must apply the latest developments in automatic data processing. These inventions will concern not only techniques for making data readily available on any given subject of interest, but will even go farther. We can foresee machines which will in fact do some of the analysts' work for them by sorting and collating data and drawing tentative conclusions.

The tasks falling to the intelligence community as a result of the President's approval of the Joint Study Group recommendations are indeed very extensive and complicated. As many of these tasks are of primary concern to the Department of Defense, we should all follow with interest and understanding the development of the new Department of Defense Intelligence Agency which was activated yesterday.

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The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be a large agency.

A recent newspaper article mentioned 1,500 people. The Director of the Agency will have responsibilities across the entire spectrum of intelligence activities. However, the National Security Agency is not included in this new organization.

The functions of the DIA include in addition to many other responsibilities the following:

1. Develop and produce all DOD intelligence estimates.
2. Assemble, integrate, and validate all DOD intelligence requirements.
3. Establish a single DOD collection requirements registry and facility.
4. Provide plans, programs, policies and procedures for DOD collection activity.
5. Conduct technical and counterintelligence functions assigned to the DIA.
6. Provide all DOD current intelligence.
7. Establish and maintain the DOD Indications Center.
8. Develop DOD intelligence research and development requirements.
9. Develop plans for integration of intelligence and counterintelligence training programs, career development programs, etc.

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10. Cooperate with CIA for mutual support, common and combined usage of facilities, resources and training programs; and the elimination of duplication.

11. Integrate intelligence automation and automatic data processing plans and programs insuring that they complement each other and those of non-DOD intelligence agencies.

12. Prepare a consolidated budget for intelligence activities.

As can be seen, the Joint Study Group Report and the 43 recommendations have already had a significant impact in the coordination of the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. This will become more apparent as the Defense Intelligence Agency gets into action. President Kennedy and his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have been informed regarding the status of implementation of each recommendation. He has directed that a semi-annual progress report be submitted by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Although much progress has been achieved, the degree of success in the coordination field will be determined by the efforts of the individual agencies of the community to police themselves and the depth of their desires to mesh their activities with each other in the common interest of national security.